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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to consider Haven M. Whitear's petition for 
review pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(a) and §34A-2-801(8)(a) of the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act" hereafter; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated).1 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Although Mr. Whitear's brief enumerates nine issues for consideration by the Court, the 
Utah Labor Commission ("Commission") believes such issues are more properly consolidated 
into six basic questions: 
1. Did the Industrial Commission err in ordering a hearing on the medical panel's 
report? 
Standard of review: On July 31, 1995, the former Industrial Commission remanded Mr. 
Whitear's claim to an ALJ with instructions to hold a hearing on the medical panel's report. At 
that time, §35-1-16 of the Workers' Compensation Act gave the Industrial Commission "the duty 
and the full power, jurisdiction, and authority to determine the facts and apply the law in this 
I 
Mr. Whitear's accident occurred during 1987. Consequently, the substantive provisions of 
the Utah Workers' Compensation Act in effect in 1987 will govern his eligibility for 
workers' compensation benefits. With respect to procedural issues, the Act was amended 
and recodified effective July 1, 1997, while Mr. Whitear's claim was in the process of 
adjudication. As a result, initial adjudicative decisions such as the Order of Remand on July 
31, 1995 were made by the former Industrial Commission pursuant to the pre-1997 Act. 
Adjudication of Mr. Whitear's claim was then completed by the Appeals Board, which was 
created by the 1997 amendments and recodification. 
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chapter or any other title or chapter it administers."2 Additionally, §35-1-77 of the Act3 gave the 
Commission discretion to determine whether a hearing was required on objections to medical 
panel reports. Lander v. Industrial Commission. 894 P.2d 552, 555 (Utah App. 1995). In light 
of the statutes' general and specific grants of discretion to the Commission, the Court should 
review the Industrial Commission's order requiring a medical panel hearing for "reasonableness 
and rationality." §63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"; Title 
63, Chapter 46b, Utah Code Annotated); Caporoz v. Industrial Commission. 945 P.2d 141, 143 
(Utah App. 1993). 
2. Did the ALJ violate UAPA by instructing Brown & Root's attorney to draft 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law? 
Standard of review: Mr. Whitear contends the ALJ violated §63-46b-10 of UAPA when 
he instructed Brown & Root's attorney to draft proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Section §63-46b-16(4)(e) of UAPA allows the Court to grant relief to Mr. Whitear if the Court 
finds the Commission "has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision making process, or has 
failed to follow prescribed procedures." The Court reviews such matters "for correction of error 
and will grant no deference to the agency's conclusion of the appropriate procedure." Krantz v. 
Utah Dept. Of Commerce, 856 P.2d 369, 370 (Utah App. 1993). 
2 
Recodified in 1997 as §34A-1-301 of the Utah Labor Commission Act. This provision and 
its predecessor, §35-1-16 of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act (1996 Supp.) are included 
in Appendix 1, "Determinative Statutes." 
3 
Recodified in 1997 as §34A-2-601(7) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. This 
provision and its predecessor, §35-1-77 (1996 Supp.) are included in Appendix 1. 
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3. Are the Appeals Board's findings regarding Mr. Whitear's credibility supported by 
the evidence? 
Mr. Whitear challenges the ALJ's determination that Mr. Whitear was not a credible 
witness. However, it is the Appeals Board, not the ALJ, which is the fact finder in workers' 
compensation preceding. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 607 P.2d 807, 810 (Utah 
1980). In Mr. Whitear's case, the Appeals Board modified the ALJ's findings regarding Mr. 
Whitear's credibility. Consequently, it is the Appeals Board's findings and conclusions regarding 
credibility which are now before the Court. 
Standard of review: This Court will defer to the Appeals Board's determination of 
credibility if supported by "substantial evidence." Drake v. Industrial Commission. 939 P.2d 177, 
181 (Utah 1997). 
4. Was Mr. Whitear denied a hearing on his claim for permanent total disability 
compensation, in violation of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and the Utah 
Constitution? 
As a threshold matter, the Commission believes Mr. Whitear failed to raise this issue in 
proceedings before the Commission. Mr. Whitear has therefore failed to preserve the issue for 
appellate review. Whether an issue has been preserved for appellate review is a question of law 
within the plenary jurisdiction of the Court. 
Only after determining that the issue was raised during proceedings before the 
Commission will the Court consider the merits of Mr. Whitear's allegation that he was denied a 
hearing. 
Standard of review: On this issue, the Court will apply a correction of error standard 
to determine whether the Appeals Board "engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision making 
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process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedures." §63-46b-16(4)(e) of UAPA; Krantz v. 
Utah Dept. Of Commerce, 856 P.2d 369, 370 (Utah App. 1993). Likewise, because "(questions 
regarding whether an administrative agency has afforded a petitioner due process in its hearings 
are questions of law(,)" the Court will not defer to the Appeals Board's determination on such 
questions. Lopez v. Industrial Commission, 834 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah App. 1992). 
5. Was Mr. Whitear's work accident a cause of his depression? 
Standard of review: This Court will apply a "substantial evidence" standard in reviewing 
the Appeals Board's finding on this question of fact and will defer to the Appeals Board's 
determination because the Appeals Board "stands in a superior position from which to evaluate 
and weigh the evidence " Drake v. Industrial Commission. 939 P.2d 177, 181(Utah 1997). 
6. Is Mr. Whitear permanently and totally disabled as a result of his work related 
asthma? 
Standard of review: As previously noted, §34A-1-301 of the Labor Commission Act 
grants the Commission "the duty and the full power, jurisdiction, and authority to determine the 
facts and apply the law in this chapter or any other title or chapter it administers." Mr. Whitear's 
claim that he is permanently and totally disabled presents a mixed question of fact and law. In 
light of the explicit grant of discretion contained in §34A-1-301 of the Labor Commission Act, 
the Court should review the Appeals Board's determination for "reasonableness and rationality." 
§63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) of UAPA; Caporoz v. Industrial Commission, 945 P.2d at 143. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The following statutes and rules are applicable to this petition for review. They are set 
forth in full in Appendix 1. 
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§35-1-16, Utah Workers' Compensation Act (1994 Repl. Vol.) 
§34A-1-301, Utah Labor Commission Act (1997 Repl. Vol.) 
§35-1-77, Utah Workers Compensation Act (1994 Repl. Vol.) 
§34A-2-601, Utah Workers' Compensation Act (1997 Repl. Vol.) 
§63-46b-10, Utah Administrative Procedures Act (1997 Repl Vol.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Commission adopts the statement of the case, including statement of facts, set forth 
in Brown & Root's brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Whitear raises six issues in challenging the Appeals Board's decision. Two of these 
issues (identified as questions 5 and 6, above) relate to the sufficiency of evidence supporting the 
Appeals Board's determinations on the merits of Mr. Whitear's claim. With respect to these 2 
questions, the Commission adopts the arguments set forth in Brown & Root's brief. 
The four remaining issues raised by Mr. Whitear (questions 1 through 4, above) deal with 
the Commission's procedures for adjudicating his claim. These issues are important not only in 
the context of Mr. Whitear's case, but with respect to the Commission's adjudication of other 
claims as well. For that reason, the Commission will respond to Mr. Whitear's arguments on 
these issues. 
First, Mr. Whitear contends the former Industrial Commission erred when it remanded 
his claim to the ALJ for a hearing on the medical panel report. However, the Industrial 
Commission's order was motivated by a need for clarity on the cause of Mr. Whitear's 
depression-a critical issue in Mr. Whitear's claim. The Industrial Commission's decision to hold 
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a hearing on the medical panel's report was, therefore, reasonable, rational and well within the 
bounds of the Industrial Commission's discretion. 
Second, Mr. Whitear argues the ALJ violated UAPA by instructing Brown & Root's 
attorney to draft proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. This argument fails for several 
reasons: 1) UAPA does not prohibit an ALJ from ordering counsel to draft proposed findings 
and conclusions; 2) other jurisdictions have found the practice acceptable; 3) Mr. Whitear failed 
to make a timely objection; and 4) any defect in the ALJ's decision was subject to review and 
correction by the Appeals Board. 
Next, Mr. Whitear challenges the ALJ's determination that his testimony was not credible. 
However, when Mr. Whitear's case came before the Appeals Board, the Board reached its own 
conclusions regarding Mr. Whitear's credibility. More importantly, the Appeals Board 
determined that Mr. Whitear's personal credibility was unimportant in light of the more probative 
evidence provided by medical experts. This Court is reviewing the Appeals Board's decision, not 
the ALJ's decision. Consequently, Mr. Whitear's attack on the ALJ's decision is moot. 
Finally, Mr. Whitear contends he was denied a hearing on his claim for permanent total 
disability compensation related to his asthma. Mr. Whitear failed to raise this issue to the ALJ 
or in his motion for review to the Appeals Board. Had he properly raised the issue at that time, 
the Appeals Board could have considered it and taken corrective action, if any such action was 
appropriate. By failing to raise the issue to the Appeals Board, Mr. Whitear has failed to preserve 
the issue for appellate review. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE DECISION TO ORDER A MEDICAL PANEL HEARING 
WAS REASONABLE, RATIONAL AND WITHIN THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION'S EXPLICIT STATUTORY AUTHORITY. 
Prior to its recodification on July 1, 1997, §35-1-77 of the Act granted the former 
Industrial Commission discretion to refer the medical issues in workers' compensation claims to 
impartial medical panels. Pursuant to that authority, a medical panel was appointed to evaluate 
Mr. Whitear's claim. (R. 934) All parties concede such a referral to the medical panel was 
proper. The medical panel, consisting of specialists in psychiatry, pulmonology and neurology, 
reviewed all Mr. Whitear's medical records and personally examined Mr. Whitear himself. (R. 
938) The medical panel then submitted its report, which concluded 1) there was no causal 
relationship between Mr. Whitear's work accident and his depression, and 2) Mr. Whitear 
suffered a 10% whole person impairment from work related asthma, which impairment did not 
prevent him from working in occupations other than as a laborer. (R. 938-945, 950-956) 
Brown & Root did not object to the medical panel's report as that report was originally 
submitted. Mr. Whitear did object to the report and requested a hearing, but only on the medical 
panel's conclusion that his work accident was not a cause of his depression. Mr. Whitear 
specifically accepted the medical panel's findings regarding his asthma. (R. 961) Later, Mr. 
Whitear withdrew his request for a hearing on the medical panel's report, but did not withdraw 
his objection to the report's findings regarding his depression. (R. 967) 
The ALJ adopted the bulk of the medical panel's report, but then discarded the panel's 
finding that no causal relation existed between Mr. Whitear's work accident and his depression. 
Instead, the ALJ amended the panel's report by substituting the opinion of Mr. Whitear's treating 
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psychologist that a causal relationship did exist between the accident and depression. (R. 971) 
In essence, the ALJ turned the medical panel's opinion upside down and reached a conclusion 
that was the opposite of the conclusion originally expressed by the medical panel. The ALJ took 
the foregoing action without holding a hearing or otherwise inquiring as to the basis for the 
medical panel's finding of no causal connection. 
Prior to the ALJ's amendment of the medical panel's report, Brown & Root had no 
reason to object to the medical panel's finding. After the ALJ's action, Brown & Root filed a 
timely request with the Industrial Commission asking that the ALJ be instructed to hold a hearing 
on the medical panel's report to develop the record on the question of the causal connection 
between Mr. Whitear's work accident and his depression. (R. 974-977) The Industrial 
Commission granted Brown & Root's request for a medical panel hearing. Mr. Whitear now 
challenges that decision. 
As already noted, the Industrial Commission had discretion to refer the medical issues in 
workers' compensation cases to a medical panel. The Act also granted the Industrial Commission 
additional discretion in considering objections to medical panel reports. Section 35-l-77(2)(e) 
of the Act provided that "(I)f objections to the (medical panel) report are filed, the commission 
may set the case for hearing to determine the facts and issues involved." Consequently, the 
determination of whether to order a hearing on a medical panel's report was entrusted to the 
sound discretion of the Commission. 
In this case, the Industrial Commission noted that the medical panel's report lacked clarity 
regarding the important medical question of whether Mr. Whitear's work accident was a cause 
of his depression. (R. 983-985) The Commission was also aware that the ALJ had taken the 
8 
unusual step of accepting the bulk of the medical panel's report, but then disregarding the medical 
panel's opinion on causation without obtaining any explanation or clarification from the medical 
panel of the reasons for its opinion. Under these circumstances, the Industrial Commission's 
determination that a hearing on the medical panel's report would be helpful was certainly 
reasonable, rational and within the limits of the Industrial Commission's statutory discretion. 
POINT II: THE ALJ DID NOT VIOLATE UAPA BY INSTRUCTING 
COUNSEL TO DRAFT PROPOSED FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS. 
At the conclusion of the hearing held on February 7, 1997, the ALJ instructed Brown & 
Root's attorney to draft and submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for the ALJ's 
review. (R. 1323, 1363) Mr. Whitear now argues that this delegation of the drafting function 
violates §63-46b-10 of UAPA. Mr. Whitear's argument is without merit for four independent 
reasons: 1) UAPA does not prohibit an ALJ from ordering counsel to draft proposed findings and 
conclusions; 2) other jurisdictions have found the practice acceptable; 3) Mr. Whitear failed to 
make a timely objection; and 4) any defect in the ALJ's decision was subject to review and 
correction by the Appeals Board. Each of these points are discussed separately below. 
A. UAPA: 
Mr. Whitear argues that §63-46b-10 of UAPA prohibits the ALJ from delegating to 
counsel the drafting of proposed findings and conclusions. However, even a cursory examination 
of the plain language of §63-46b-10 shows the statute contains no such prohibition. Section 63-
46b-10 provides that the ALJ "shall sign and issue" an order that includes the ALJ's findings, 
conclusions, and reasons for decision. Nothing in the statute limits the ALJ from delegating the 
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drafting of the order, so long as the order, when signed and issued by the ALJ, reflects the ALJ's 
own findings and conclusions. 
In this case, before announcing his decision, the ALJ had reviewed Mr. Whitear's file, 
listened to a full day of testimony, and also listened to the parties' closing arguments. The ALJ 
was fully informed of the parties' respective views of the evidence and law. When it came time 
to make his decision, the ALJ provided a substantial explanation of his findings and reasoning. 
(R. 1316-1324) This record shows it was the ALJ who decided Mr. Whitear's case and that the 
decision which was "signed and issued" by the ALJ is consistent with his own findings and 
conclusions. The decision therefore satisfies the requirements of §63-46b-10 of UAPA. 
B. OTHER JURISDICTIONS: 
The Commission is advised that the district courts of this state commonly delegate the 
drafting of findings of fact and conclusions of law to counsel. In administrative adjudications, 
it is well settled that "(t)here is no constitutional prohibition against findings being drawn by the 
successful party at the direction or with the permission of the administrative hearing." 73 A CJS, 
Public Administrative Law and Procedure, §144, p. 108. Likewise, in Willapoint Oysters. Inc. 
v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676, 694 (9th Circuit 1949) the federal appellate court rejected a challenge to 
the practice: 
In judicial proceedings, the separation of judge and litigant necessary for a 
minimum of fairness is in that portion of the decisional process involved in 
actually making the decision. (Citations omitted.) It cannot be contended that 
mere drawing of the findings is participation in the actual decision. 
Likewise, the New Mexico Court of Appeals has considered this same issue in the context 
of that state's workers' compensation system. In Nunez v. Smith's Management Corp.. 769 P.2d 
10 
99 (N.M. App. 1988), the New Mexico court noted the benefits of ALJs drafting their own 
decisions, but concluded as follows: 
In these circumstances, u ( e ) v e n the adaption of verbatim findings is not in error 
if they are supported by the record." In re Hamilton, 97 N.M. Ill, 114 637 P. 2d 
542, 545 (1981). Because, as discussed below, we find substantial support in the 
record for the findings specifically challenged by the claimant we do not remand 
for new findings. (Citations omitted.) 
These decisions upheld ALJs' decisions which were drafted by counsel for one of the 
parties. The Commission has been unable to find any court decisions to the contrary. Mr. 
Whitear has failed to identify any precedent in support of his argument. The Commission 
therefore submits that the ALJ's action of delegating the drafting of his decision in this case is 
not contrary to well established practice, in Utah and in other jurisdictions. 
C. FAILURE TO OBJECT: 
At the end of the hearing on February 7, 1997, the ALJ asked Brown & Root's attorney 
to prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law. The following exchange then took place 
between the ALJ, Mr. Poelman, Brown & Root's attorney, and Mr. Scheffler, Mr. Whitear's 
attorney (R. 1323, 1324): 
The Court: . . . Mr. Poelman, if you will prepare the findings of fact and conclusions 
of law and order. 
Mr. Poelman: Thank you. 
Mr. Scheffler: Is Mr. Whitear entitled to be paid for the 10% impairment that the panel 
gave him, which is not in dispute? 
The ALJ: He is. 
Mr. Scheffler: And he's entitled to be paid for the preexisting conditions as well, since 
this is a pre-'8 8 accident? 
The ALJ: He is. 
Mr. Scheffler: With interest? 
The ALJ: With interest. 
Mr. Scheffler: Will that be part of the order? 
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The Court: It will, and we'll even throw in attorneys fees. All right. Is there anything 
else we haven't covered? 
Mr. Scheffler: Payment of medical bills. I didn't present any evidence, since it wasn't an 
issue, as to causation, but I think there's a prior order from 1989 whereby 
the defense is required to pay all reasonable medical expenses related to 
the asthma, and I would . . . . 
The Court: And as to the asthma I would agree all the medical expenses there should 
be paid. Any questions Mr. Poelman? 
Mr. Poelman: I don't believe so. 
The Court: Okay, thank you. (Thereby concluding the hearing.) 
This excerpt demonstrates that Mr. Whitear did not object to Brown & Root's attorney 
drafting proposed findings and conclusions. Not only was Mr. Whitear silent as to any objection, 
but he actively participated in suggesting items that should be included in the decision. 
By failing to raise his objection at a time when the ALJ could have considered the matter 
and taken corrective action if necessary, Mr. Whitear waived his right to raise the objection at a 
later time. As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Johnson v. Simmons. 551 P.2d 515,517 (Utah 
1976) in reference to objections to jury instructions, "Counsel owe a continuing duty to the court 
to make timely objections or exceptions to rulings and instructions so that the court may correct 
any error which requires correction during the course of the proceeding. 
The Commission does not believe that the ALJ's delegation of the drafting function was 
an error. But if it was, Mr. Whitear waived any objection by failing to raise it at the time the 
alleged error occurred. 
D. CORRECTION BY THE APPEAL BOARD. 
Even if there is merit to Mr. Whitear contention that it was improper for Brown & Root's 
attorney to draft the proposed decision, the process for adjudicating workers' compensation 
claims includes a protective feature that corrected the supposed error-namely, the ability of a 
12 
dissatisfied party such as Mr. Whitear to obtain a complete review of the ALJ's findings by the 
Appeals Board. 
In cases brought before it, the Appeals Board serves as the ultimate finder of fact and is 
not bound by the decision of the ALJ. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission. 607 P.2d 807, 
811 (Utah 1980) Section 34A-l-303(4)(a) of the Act specifically empowers the Appeals Board 
to affirm, modify or reverse the decision of the ALJ, or return the case to the ALJ for further 
proceedings. 
Because the Appeals Board was not bound to defer to the ALJ's findings or conclusions, 
Mr. Whitear had the opportunity to obtain a full review of the order issued by the ALJ. In fact, 
Mr. Whitear availed himself of that right. As a result of Mr. Whitear's motion for review to the 
Appeals Board, the Board affirmed the ALJ's decision in some respects. In other respects, the 
Appeals Board disagreed with the ALJ and substituted its own conclusions. Thus, even if the 
participation of Brown & Root's attorney in drafting the ALJ's decision somehow tainted the 
ALJ's decision, any such impropriety was corrected by the Appeals Board's review of the 
decision. 
In summary, the ALJ did not violate statute or precedent by ordering Brown & Root's 
attorney to draft a proposed decision. Furthermore, Mr. Whitear waived his objection by failing 
to raise it at the proper time. Finally, any error on the part of the ALJ was cured by the Appeals 
Board's review of the ALJ's decision. 
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POINT III: IT IS THE APPEALS BOARD'S FINDINGS, NOT THOSE OF 
THE ALJ, THAT ARE SUBJECT TO REVIEW. THE BOARD'S 
FINDINGS REGARDING MR. WHITEAR'S CREDIBILITY ARE 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Mr. Whitear attacks the ALJ's finding that Mr. Whitear's testimony was not credible. 
However, Mr. Whitear's argument overlooks a critical fact-it is the Appeals Board's decision, 
not the ALJ's decision, that is under review by this Court. Mr. Whitear fails to address the 
Appeals Board's decision regarding credibility at all. 
As can be seen from the following excerpt from the Appeals Board's decision (R. 1640, 
1641), the Appeals Board relied on its own evaluation of the evidence in assessing Mr. Whitear's 
credibility: 
Mr. Whitear contends the ALJ erred in concluding he lacked credibility. The 
Appeals Board agrees with Mr. Whitear that some of the ALJ's examples of Mr. 
Whitear's lack of credibility are unpersuasive. However, other factors do 
undercut Mr. Whitear's credibility, such as his claim of the ability to smell 
perfume at a distance of one mile and his unpersuasive performance on 
psychological and physical tests administered by the medical experts. 
Furthermore, the ALJ was in the position to directly observe Mr. Whitear's 
demeanor during the hearing. Consequently, the Appeals Board accepts the ALJ's 
conclusion regarding Mr. Whitear's credibility. 
The foregoing passage reveals that the Appeals Board did not accept some of the ALJ's 
reasoning regarding Mr. Whitear's credibility. However, the Appeals Board noted some of Mr. 
Whitear's testimony was exaggerated and that psychological testing indicated a lack of credibility. 
The Appeals Board also acknowledged that the ALJ had the benefit of personally observing Mr. 
Whitear's demeanor during testimony. For these reasons, the Appeals Board agreed with the ALJ 
that Mr. Whitear's testimony lacked credibility. But the Appeals Board concluded its discussion 
of credibility with the following observation: 
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More importantly, the Appeals Board notes that Mr. Whitear's eligibility for 
workers' compensation benefits does not depend on his personal credibility, 
but rather, on the reasoned opinions of the qualified medical experts who 
have examined him. (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, the Appeals Board's decision regarding Mr. Whitear's claim is not based on Mr. 
Whitear's personal credibility, but on the medical evidence that was before the Appeals Board. 
In light of the Appeals Board's modification of the ALJ's credibility determination and 
the Board's recognition that Mr. Whitear's claim should be decided on the medical evidence 
rather than credibility, Mr. Whitear's attack on the ALJ's credibility determination is misplaced 
and immaterial to the resolution of this appeal. 
POINT IV: IN PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION, MR. 
WHITEAR DID NOT CONTEND THAT HE HAD BEEN DENIED A 
HEARING ON HIS CLAIM FOR PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY 
COMPENSATION. HE HAS THEREFORE FAILED TO PRESERVE 
THAT ISSUE FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW. 
Mr. Whitear contends he was denied the opportunity for a hearing on his claim of asthma-
related permanent total disability. However, Mr. Whitear failed to raise this issue before the 
Appeals Board. 
Appellate courts will not consider issues that are raised for the first time on appeal.4 
Section 63-46b-14(2) of UAPA requires exhaustion of "all administrative remedies" as a 
precondition to appellate review. In workers' compensation cases, after an ALJ makes the initial 
decision on a disputed claim, dissatisfied parties can obtain de novo agency review by filing a 
motion for review with either the Labor Commissioner or the Appeals Board. (See §34A-1 -303 
4 
Jurisdictional issues may be raised at any time. Also, UAPA §63-46b-14(2)(a) and (b) sets 
forth two types of cases where exhaustion of remedies is not required. However, neither 
category applies to the facts of this case. 
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of the Labor Commission Act.) Consequently, the parties to workers' compensation proceedings 
have not exhausted their administrative remedies, and cannot obtain judicial review, until they 
have presented their disputes to the Appeals Board or Commission. 
With respect to Mr. Whitear's claim that the ALJ violated his right to a hearing under 
UAPA and the Utah Constitution, his motion for review (R. 1401-1513) to the Appeals Board 
does not raise any such issue. To the contrary, Mr. Whitear's motion for review merely argued 
that the ALJ's decision denying his claim for asthma-related permanent total disability 
compensation was not supported by the evidence. He did not suggest that he had been denied a 
hearing or that his statutory and constitutional rights to hearing had been abridged—in fact, he did 
not mention UAPA or the Utah Constitution at all.5 
As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Brown & Root v. Industrial Commission. 947 P.2d 
671, 677 (Utah 1997): 
We have consistently held that issues not raised in proceedings before 
administrative agencies are not subject to judicial review except in exceptional 
circumstances. (Citations omitted.) No reason has been suggested why an 
exception should be made here. The rule that courts should not reach issues on 
review that were not raised before the administrative agency is so basic and 
necessary to orderly procedure that we will enforce it despite the lack of a timely 
objection by the Commission or Wardrop. 
The same principle applies with equal force in this case. Because Mr. Whitear failed to 
raise the alleged denial of his statutory or constitutional right to hearing before the Commission, 
this Court must decline to consider that issue on appeal. 
The Commission also notes that Mr. Whitear failed to satisfy the requirement of Rule 
24(a)(5)(A), U. Rules App. P., that he affirmatively demonstrate he has preserved this issue 
for appellate review by citation to the record. 
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CONCLUSION 
With respect to the procedural issues raised in Mr. Whitear's brief, the Commission 
respectfully submits that such issues are without merit. Mr. Whitear's arguments misapprehend 
the procedural standards established by UAPA and the Workers' Compensation Act and confuse 
the important distinction between the ALJ's decision, which is subject to de novo review by the 
Appeals Board, and the Appeals Board's decision, which is the subject of appellate review by this 
Court. Additionally, because Mr. Whitear failed to raise several of his arguments before the 
Appeals Board, he has failed to preserve those arguments for review by this Court. 
With respect to Mr. Whitear's substantive arguments which are not directly addressed by 
the Commission in this brief, the Commission adopts the arguments set forth in the brief 
submitted by Brown & Root. 
In conclusion, the Commission requests that the Court dismiss Mr. Whitear's petition for 
review and affirm the decision of the Appeals Board. 
Submitted this 15th day of July, 1998. 
Alan Hennebold 
General Counsel 
Utah Labor Commission 
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§35-1-16, Utah Workers' Compensation Act (1994 Repl. Vol.) 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 35-1-16 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 100 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensa- Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation 
tion § 384. e=> 1090. 
35-1-16, Powers and duties of commission — Fees, 
(1) The commission has the duty and the full power, jurisdiction, and 
authority to determine the facts and apply the law in this or any other title or 
chapter that it administers and to: 
(a) supervise every employment and place of employment and to 
administer and enforce all laws for the protection of the life, health, safety, 
and welfare of employees; 
(b) ascertain and fix reasonable standards, and prescribe, modify, and 
enforce reasonable orders, for the adoption of safety devices, safeguards, 
and other means or methods of protection, to be as nearly uniform as 
possible, as necessary to carry out all laws and lawful orders relative to the 
protection of the life, health, safety, and welfare of employees in employ-
ment and places of employment; 
(c) ascertain, fix, and order reasonable standards for the construction, 
repair, and maintenance of places of employment as shall make them safe; 
(d) investigate, ascertain, and determine reasonable classifications of 
persons, employments, and places of employment as necessary to carry out 
the purposes of this title; 
(e) promote the voluntary arbitration, mediation, and conciliation of 
disputes between employers and employees; 
(f) establish and conduct free employment agencies, and license, super-
vise, and regulate private employment offices, and bring together employ-
ers seeking employees and working people seeking employment, and make 
known the opportunities for employment in this state; 
(g) collect, collate, and publish statistical and other information relat-
ing to employees, employers, employments, and places of employment and 
such other statistics as it considers proper; and 
(h) ascertain and adopt reasonable standards and rules, prescribe and 
enforce reasonable orders, and take such other actions as may be appro-
priate for the protection of life, health, safety, and welfare of all persons 
with respect to all prospects, tunnels, pits, banks, open cut workings, 
quarries, strip mine operations, ore mills, and surface operations or any 
other mining operation, whether or not the relationship of employer and 
employee exists, but the commission may not assume jurisdiction or 
authority over adopted standards and regulations or perform any mining 
inspection or enforcement of mining rules and regulations so long as 
Utah's mining operations are governed by federal regulations. 
(2) Unless otherwise provided by statute, the commission may adopt a 
schedule of fees assessed for services provided by the commission. The fee shall 
be reasonable and fair, and shall reflect the cost of services provided. Each fee 
established in this manner shall be submitted to and approved by the 
Legislature as part of the commission's annual appropriations request. The 
commission may not charge or collect any fee proposed in this manner without 
approval by the Legislature. Prior to submitting any proposed fee to the 
Legislature, the commission shall conduct a public hearing on the proposed 
fee. 
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review an order or decision that is subject to review by the Appeals Board 
under this title. 
(2) (a) The governor shall appoint the members with the advice and consent 
of the Senate and in accordance with this section. 
(b) One member of the board shall be appointed to represent employers, 
in making this appointment, the governor shall consider nominations from 
employer organizations. 
(c) One member of the board shall be appointed to represent employees, 
in making this appointment, the governor shall consider nominations from 
employee organizations. 
(d) No more than two members may belong to the same political party. 
(3) (a) The term of a member shall be six years beginning on March 1 of the 
year the member is appointed, except that the governor shall, at the time 
of appointment or reappointment, adjust the length of terms to ensure 
that the terms of members are staggered so that one member is appointed 
every two years. 
(b) The governor may remove a member only for inefficiency, neglect of 
duty, malfeasance or misfeasance in office, or other good and sufficient 
cause. 
(c) A member shall hold office until a successor is appointed and has 
qualified. 
(4) A member shall be part-time and receive compensation as provided by 
Title 67, Chapter 19, State Personnel Management Act. 
(5) (a) The chief officer of the board shall be the chair, who shall serve as the 
executive and administrative head of the board. 
(b) The governor shall appoint and may remove at will the chair from 
the position of chair. 
(6) A majority of the board shall constitute a quorum to transact business. 
(7) (a) The commission shall provide the Appeals Board necessary staff 
support, except as provided in Subsection (7)(b). 
(b) At the request of the Appeals Board, the attorney general shall act 
as an impartial aid to the Appeals Board in outlining the facts and the 
issues. 
History: C. 1953, 34A-1-205, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 375, § 
1997, ch. 375, § 63. 328 makes the act effective on July 1, 1997. 
PART 3 
ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
34A-1-301. Commission jurisdict ion and power. 
The commission has the duty and the full power, jurisdiction, and authority 
to determine the facts and apply the law in this chapter or any other title or 
chapter it administers. 
History: C. 1953,35A-3-801, enacted by L. section which formerly appeared as 35A-3-801, 
1996, ch. 240, § 181; renumbered by L. and substituted "commission" for "department." 
1997, ch. 375, § 64. Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 240, 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- § 378 makes the act effective on July 1, 1997. 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this Compiler's Notes. — 
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION 35-1-77 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 99 C J.S. Workmen's Compensation 
§ 292. 
35-1-77. Medical panel — Medical director or medical 
consultants — Discretionary authori ty of com-
mission to refer case — Findings and repor ts — 
Objections to report — Hearing — Expenses, 
(1) (a) Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by accident, or 
for death, arising out of and in the course of employment, and if the 
employer or its insurance carrier denies liability, the commission may 
refer the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by the 
commission. 
(b) When a claim for compensation based upon disability or death due 
to an occupational disease is filed with the commission, the commission 
shall, except upon stipulation of all parties, appoint an impartial medical 
panel. 
(c) A medical panel shall consist of one or more physicians specializing 
in the treatment of the disease or condition involved in the claim. 
(d) As an alternative method of obtaining an impartial medical evalu-
ation of the medical aspects of a controverted case, the commission may 
employ a medical director or medical consultants on a full-time or 
part-time basis for the purpose of evaluating the medical evidence and 
advising the commission with respect to its ultimate fact-finding respon-
sibility. If all parties agree to the use of a medical director or medical 
consultants, they shall be allowed to function in the same manner and 
under the same procedures as required of a medical panel. 
(2) (a) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall 
make such study, take such X-rays, and perform such tests, including 
post-mortem examinations if authorized by the commission, as it may 
determine to be necessary or desirable. 
(b) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall 
make a report in writing to the commission in a form prescribed by the 
commission, and also make such additional findings as the commission 
may require. In occupational disease cases, the panel shall certify to the 
commission the extent, if any, of the disability of the claimant from 
performing work for remuneration or profit, and whether the sole cause of 
the disability or death, in the opinion of the panel, results from the 
occupational disease and whether any other causes have aggravated, 
prolonged, accelerated, or in any way contributed to the disability or 
death, and if so, the extent in percentage to which the other causes have 
so contributed. 
(c) The commission shall promptly distribute full copies of the report to 
the applicant, the employer, and its insurance carrier by certified mail 
with return receipt requested. Within 15 days after the report is deposited 
in the United States post office, the applicant, the employer, or its 
insurance carrier may file with the commission written objections to the 
report. If no written objections are filed within that period, the report is 
considered admitted in evidence. 
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(d) The commission may base its finding and decision on the report of 
the panel, medical director, or medical consultants, but is not bound by the 
report if other substantial conflicting evidence in the case supports a 
contrary finding. 
(e) If objections to the report are filed, the commission may set the case 
for hearing to determine the facts and issues involved. At the hearing, any 
party so desiring may request the commission to have the chairman of the 
medical panel, the medical director, or the medical consultants present at 
the hearing for examination and cross-examination. For good cause 
shown, the commission may order other members of the panel, with or 
without the chairman or the medical director or medical consultants, to be 
present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination. 
(f) The written report of the panel, medical director, or medical consult-
ants may be received as an exhibit at the hearing, but may not be 
considered as evidence in the case except as far as it is sustained by the 
testimony admitted. 
(g) The expenses of the study and report of the medical panel, medical 
director, or medical consultants and the expenses of their appearance 
before the commission shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 52, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 42-1-71.10; L. 1955, ch. 57, § 1; 1969, 
ch. 86, § 9; 1979, ch. 138, § 6; 1982, ch. 41, 
§ 1; 1988, ch. 116, § 7; 1991, ch. 136, § 13; 
1994, ch. 224, § 7. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted the 
first "and" for "or" in Subsection (l)(a) and 
deleted the former second sentence, which read 
"The panel shall have the qualifications gener-
ANALYSIS 
Duty of commission on remand of case. 
Effect of 1982 amendment. 
Function of medical panel. 
Objections to report. 
Panel report as evidence. 
Qualifications of panel members. 
Referral to panel. 
—Discretion. 
Report, statements, and admissions. 
Supplemental award. 
Cited. 
Duty of commission on remand of case. 
Where an order of the commission was va-
cated and the cause remanded because of a 
deficiency in the evidence to support the report 
of a medical panel appointed by the commis-
sion, the commission was not required to make 
an award based solely on the plaintiff's evi-
dence; but it was the responsibility of the com-
mission to make some disposition of plaintiff's 
application for an award and it was the pre-
ally applicable to the medical panel under Sec-
tion 35-2-56"; added Subsections (l)(b) and (c) 
and redesignated former Subsection (1Kb) as 
(l)(d); and added the second sentence in Sub-
section (2)(b). 
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, 
deleted "in its sole discretion" following "com-
mission" in the first sentence in Subsection 
(l)(d) and substituted "certified" for "registered" 
in the first sentence in Subsection (2)(c). 
rogative of the commission to make a determi-
nation upon the evidence in the light of the 
decision of the Supreme Court or to order and 
hold a supplemental hearing to allow the par-
ties to present additional evidence. Hackford v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 12 Utah 2d 250, 364 P.2d 
1091 (1961). 
Effect of 1982 amendment. 
The 1982 amendment of this section, making 
the granting of a hearing discretionary, does 
not enlarge or destroy vested or contractual 
rights; rather, it governs the process under 
which claims are disposed of by the commis-
sion. Moore v. American Coal Co., 737 P.2d 989 
(Utah 1987); Ortiz v. Industrial Comm'n, 766 
P.2d 1092 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
This section is procedural and may be applied 
to an accident that occurred before the 1982 
amendments. Ortiz v. Industrial Comm'n, 766 
P.2d 1092 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Function of medical panel. 
It is the function of the medical panel to give 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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WORKERS* COMPENSATION ACT 34A-2-601 
PART 6 
MEDICAL EVALUATIONS 
34A-2-801. Medical panel — Medical director or medical 
consultants — Discretionary authori ty of Divi-
sion of Adjudication to refer case — Findings 
and reports — Objections to repor t — Hearing — 
Expenses. 
(1) (a) Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by accident, or 
for death, arising out of and in the course of employment, and if the 
employer or its insurance carrier denies liability, the Division of Adjudi-
cation may refer the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel 
appointed by an administrative law judge. 
(b) When a claim for compensation based upon disability or death due 
to an occupational disease is filed with the Division of Adjudication, an 
administrative law judge shall, except upon stipulation of all parties, 
appoint an impartial medical panel. 
(c) A medical panel shall consist of one or more physicians specializing 
in the treatment of the disease or condition involved in the claim. 
(d) As an alternative method of obtaining an impartial medical evalu-
ation of the medical aspects of a controverted case, the division may 
employ a medical director or medical consultants on a full-time or 
part-time basis for the purpose of evaluating the medical evidence and 
advising an administrative law judge with respect to the administrative 
law judge's ultimate fact-finding responsibility. 
(e) If all parties agree to the use of a medical director or medical 
consultants, the medical director or medical consultants shall be allowed 
to function in the same manner and under the same procedures as 
required of a medical panel. 
(2) (a) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall 
make such study, take such X-rays, and perform such tests, including 
post-mortem examinations if authorized by the administrative law judge, 
as it may determine to be necessary or desirable. 
(b) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall 
make: 
(i) a report in writing to the administrative law judge in a form 
prescribed by the Division of Adjudication; and 
(ii) additional findings as the administrative law judge may re-
quire. 
(c) In occupational disease cases, in addition to the requirements of 
Subsection (2)(b), the panel shall certify to the administrative law judge: 
(i) the extent, if any, of the disability of the claimant from perform-
ing work for remuneration or profit; 
(ii) whether the sole cause of the disability or death, in the opinion 
of the panel, results from the occupational disease; and 
(iii) whether any other causes have aggravated, prolonged, accel-
erated, or in any way contributed to the disability or death, and if so, 
the extent in percentage to which the other causes have so contrib-
uted. 
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(d) (i) The administrative law judge shall promptly distribute full 
copies of the report by certified mail with return receipt requested to: 
(A) the applicant; 
(B) the employer; and 
(C) the employer's insurance carrier. 
(ii) Within 15 days after the report is deposited in the United States 
post office, the applicant, the employer, or its insurance carrier may 
file with the administrative law judge written objections to the report. 
(iii) If no written objections are filed within that period, the report 
is considered admitted in evidence. 
(e) The administrative law judge may base the administrative law 
judge's finding and decision on the report of the panel, medical director, or 
medical consultants, but is not bound by the report if other substantial 
conflicting evidence in the case supports a contrary finding. 
(f) (i) If objections to the report are filed, the administrative law judge 
may set the case for hearing to determine the facts and issues 
involved. 
(ii) At the hearing, any party so desiring may request the admin-
istrative law judge to have the chair of the medical panel, the medical 
director, or the medical consultants present at the hearing for exami-
nation and cross-examination. 
(iii) For good cause shown, the administrative law judge may order 
other members of the panel, with or without the chair or the medical 
director or medical consultants, to be present at the hearing for 
examination and cross-examination. 
(g) The written report of the panel, medical director, or medical con-
sultants may be received as an exhibit at the hearing, but may not be 
considered as evidence in the case except as far as it is sustained by the 
testimony admitted. 
(h) For any claim referred under Subsection (1) to a medical panel, 
medical director, or medical consultant before July 1, 1997, the commis-
sion shall pay out of the Employers Reinsurance Fund established in 
Section 34A-2-702: 
(i) expenses of the study and report of the medical panel, medical 
director, or medical consultant; and 
(ii) the expenses of the panel's, director's, or consultant's appear-
ance before the administrative law judge, 
(i) For any claim referred under Subsection (1) to a medical panel, 
medical director, or medical consultant on or after July 1, 1997, the 
commission shall pay out of the Uninsured Employers' Fund established 
in Section 34A-2-704: 
(i) the expenses of the study and report of the medical panel, 
medical director, or medical consultant; and 
(ii) the expenses of the panel's, director's, or consultant's appear-
ance before the administrative law judge. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 52, § 1; C. 1943, ch. 240, § 173; 1997, ch. 45, § 1; renum-
Supp., 42-1-71.10; L. 1955, ch. 57, § 1; 1969, bered by L. 1997, ch. 375, § 138. 
ch. 86, § 9; 1979, ch. 138, § 6; 1982, ch. 41, Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
§ 1; 1988, ch. 116, § 7; 1991, ch. 136, § 13; ment, effective May 2, 1994, deleted "in its sole 
1994, ch. 224, § 7; renumbered by L. 1996, discretion" following "commission" in the first 
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ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT 63-46b-10 
Allegations by members of environmental Ci ted in Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Tax 
organization that their use and enjoyment of Comm'n ex rel. MCI Telecommunications 
Western Utah would have been adversely af- Corp., 895 P.2d 825 (Utah 1995). 
fected failed to show or allege any specific 
injury causally related to the alleged illegal 
activity. Sierra Club v Department of Envtl. 
Quality, 857 P.2d 982 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
63-46b-10. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceed-
ings — Orders. 
In formal adjudicative proceedings: 
(1) Within a reasonable time after the hearing, or after the filing of any 
post-hearing papers permitted by the presiding officer, or within the time 
required by any applicable statute or rule of the agency, the presiding 
officer shall sign and issue an order that includes: 
(a) a statement of the presiding officer's findings of fact based 
exclusively on the evidence of record in the adjudicative proceedings 
or on facts officially noted; 
(b) a statement of the presiding officer's conclusions of law; 
(c) a statement of the reasons for the presiding officer's decision; 
(d) a statement of any relief ordered by the agency; 
(e) a notice of the right to apply for reconsideration; 
(f) a notice of any right to administrative or judicial review of the 
order available to aggrieved parties; and 
(g) the time limits applicable to any reconsideration or review. 
(2) The presiding officer may use his experience, technical competence, 
and specialized knowledge to evaluate the evidence. 
(3) No finding of fact that was contested may be based solely on hearsay 
evidence unless that evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. 
(4) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from issuing 
interim orders to: 
(a) notify the parties of further hearings; 
(b) notify the parties of provisional rulings on a portion of the 
issues presented; or 
(c) otherwise provide for the fair and efficient conduct of the 
adjudicative proceeding. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-10, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 161, § 266; 1988, ch. 72, § 20. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS "written order" under § 63-46b-13(3). Lopez v. 
Career Serv. Review Bd., 834 P.2d 568 (Utah 
Ct. App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah Contents of order. 
Right to appeal. 1992)* 
Cited. 
Contents of order. Right to appeal. 
This section requires considerable detail in When a right to reconsideration exists, Sub-
agency orders issued in connection with formal section (l)(e) of this section requires notice to 
adjudicative procedures, so an ambiguous let- petitioner of that right; Real Estate Commis-
ter, merely indicating that the request for re- sion order confirming and adopting an Admin-
consideration was unpersuasive, was not a istrative Law Judge's findings and conclusions 
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